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Justice as Transcendence in Translation: Sin思darityand Experience 
in Derrida 
YE ZHU 
Graduate School of Education, Kyoto University 
This paper starts削 tha I印刷ceabout tran均tionthat is a citation in the latter work of 
Derrida, Donner la morιwhich com出ftom Kierkegaard. It sのISthatヂeechtra町 lat，百
singularity却 universa占ty.司Y）も！lowingDerrida's ana伊isof the absolute 悶rponsib1均 in
con tr別 twith the human ethics in Kierkegaard, I wt!! show that how trans!atiori is the key 
for these削 oconeψ白山ith出 negative四 nnotation.But f山 'flfind a positive connation 
印 刷即日atingthis inte.ゅretationwith the anaウ•sis of the justice in Derrida, in which the 
re/ationshヂ betweenthe J川町 andthe law has the same stn1cture of the d針。lute
げ伊onsib1占tyand the human ethics. In the end, combining these two analyses inふothe 
仰 tobiogr. hical work of Derrida, we will se the positi町市rpectof抑 ns/ationthat is the 
enzanc.伊ationof the so占印deofotmelv目！
Toure decision devrait ainsi, en son fond, rester主laゐ1ssoli回ire,secrete et s1lenc1euse. 
La parole nous apaise, note Kierkegaard, parce qu’elleαtraduit抄 dans!'universe! 
(Derrida, 1999, p. 87). 
In his later work“Donner la mort," Derrida gives us a short pa日agetalkmg about translation and 
language by drawmg a pa日agefrom Cramte et tremb/ement. Derrida emphasizes the word 
“translate”. This part about translation does not particularly stand out in the whole book. But it 
is very powerful五orus ro think of translation, which cannot be limited to an interlingual 
phenomenon but rather has some essennal relationship with smgulamy and language. In this 
paper, I will follow this direction in order to reconsider translation. 
TRANSLATION BETWEEN SINGULARITY AND GENERALITY 
In order to understand what Derrida says about the singulariry and language in "Donner la 
mort," we should pay attention ro the difference between 'mponsibiliry" and “ethi口J’which
are usually taken to be the same thing. But rhey will be opposite to each other in an 四 creme
SI印ation.Abraham was in such situation when he was ordered by god to sacrifice his son Isaac 
to prove his faithfulness. Accordmg to Derrida’s analysis, if Abraham follows god’s commands 
he would be a murderer that means a failure to fulfil ethical obliganons. But at the same time, 
savmg his son’s life would be the failure to answer god’s requ白tand failure to prove his 
faithfulness. Though It seems to be an extremely religious situation that is unfamiliar to us, it is 
much more familiar to us than it seems albeit in another way if only we pay some attennon 
to the fact that we can find countless scen田 ofsuch a kind in films, in which the main character 
has to choose between sa口if口nghis own family and lemng many unknown people die. As 
many of those characters do, Abraham chooses to go beyond the limit of ethics to sacrifice his 
son This 1s what Dernda cals “sacnfice of the ethical”（p. 98). 
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The conflict between what he cals rhe“ethical" and what he cals "responsibility”shows 
that there IS a limit in the ethical that belongs to the element of generality (following 
Kierkegaard’s defininon) Accordrng ro Dernda’s explanauon, we are called ro expla111 and 
JUstifシouracrs to othet people, to be responsible in a general sense (p 88). But this idea of 
responsibility, which IS quite familiar to us, is a srumblrng block fot Abraham m h!S case. Ir is 
an essential problem fot Derrida to explain why Abraham does not explain anything to his 
family. While it seems that what he does is against common idea of responsibility, Derrida 
thinks that the normal idea of responsibility fails to define the word“responsibility：” the 
“ethical”comes to its own limit. Thereゐreit is not the case that Abraham refus田 toexplain 
anything bur rather he could not do so because if he did so he would fail to阻kehis 
responsibility before god. Derrida writ田，
Or que nous enseig悶 raitAb 
d'assurer la mponsロ主bilite,Ia g己n己ralit己de l'ethique pousse a l'irresponsabilite El e 
enrraine主patler，主 r己pondre，主 rendrecompre, donc a dissoudre ma singularite clans 
l'element du concept (ibid.). 
If we keep making excus目 aboutour actions we will be irresponsible in such a situation. The 
ethical is unavailable or even harmful in this case. It requir国 somethingmore than the 
generality of ethics This is what Derrida cals singularity. 
Ethics, in its generality, is based on the possibility of substitution.“Anyone”will do in such 
a situation from wherein the quesnon of “who”IS strictly excluded. The exclusion makes 
responsibility impoSStble in this case. This case is not a particular one that we could meet 
“sometimes，＇’bur one that fundamen四lyd1Scloses what tesponS1biliry is. But Derrida does not 
sugg回 Ethat we should simply give up generalized ethics to be responsible; if we just simply give 
up ethi日 thenwe fal into mere mesponsib1llty. 
Le devoir absolu exige qu’on se conduise de fa<;on irresponsable (per自dieou parjure) 
tour en reconnaissant, confirmant, reaffirmant cela m是mequ’on sacrifice, a savoir 
l’ordre de l’ethique et de la responsabilire humaines. En un mot, i’erh1que dolt erre 
sacrifiee au nom du devoir (p. 96). 
Just as Abraham loves his son until last moment of the sacnfice, we need to maintain our 
human ethicality, ro be a responsible-even though this responsibility is to be betrayed. The 
difference between absolute duty (responsibility) and general educs is the singularity of oneself. 
Ir keeps one in secret, solitude and silence, as it is referred to in the beginning of this paper. 
There IS a movement here in which generality, which is the element of language, comes to its 
limit to be negated It is the place where translation functions. This sense of translanon has a 
close relattonship with justice, which is whar we shall examine next 
JUSTICE IN TRANSLATION 
Ar the beginning of Force de Loi, Derrida refers to translation as rhe center of rhe issue of JUstice 
のernda,1994, pp. 16-17). The issue of translation appears again soon in a clear assertion. 
S'adresser主I'autre dans la langue de l'autre, c’est主lafois la condmon de rou日justice
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possible, semble+il, mais cela parait non seulement impo田1bleen route rigueur 
(puisque je ne peux parler la langue de l'autre que dans la mesure oil je me l'approprie 
et l’assimile selon la loi d’un tie四 implicite)mais meme exclu par la jusnce comme 
drott en四nrqu’elesemble tmpltquer un element d’untversalite, le recours au ters qui 
suspend l’unilateralite ou la singulanre des id10mes (p. 40). 
One’s own singularity cannot merely be strictly subjected to the generalities of law, but at the 
same ttme, thts ts nece回aryfor JUSttce. Dernda pom白 outthat here, translat10n begms to 
funcnon across impossibility, of which justice is the experience (p 37) 
Justice has rhe四mesrrucrure as mponsibiliry, which I have jusr menrioned above. It is 
different from the law (general rules) because justice has to deal with singularity, which the 
general rule does not encounter or expect. In addition, it is important to emphasize that justice 
requires its realizat旧n,or better to say that justice has to be done, just as Abraham is required to 
But such realtzatton cannot be JUStice tself as well as the rranslatton always remams 1mposs1ble 
in stncr sense. Realization is the translation of justice. 
Justice here works just as Benjamin’s idea of“pure language" does, and which Derrida refers 
to in D出向U円 deBabel. For Benpmin, pure language is to be achieved m the process of 
translation, just like fragments of a vessel coming together (Benjamin, 2004, p 260). Resisting 
the teleological character of this idea, Derrida writes it in another way. 
ーc’estl’etre-langue de la langue, la langue OU le langage en tant que tels, Cette Untte 
sans aucune tdentit己主 soiqui fait qu'il y a des langues, et que ce sont de langues 
(Derrida, 1985, p. 245). 
He shifts the pure language from the telos of various languages to the very being of languages 
the possibility of languages and translation. The dtstance of the various languages and pure 
language cannot be overcome (p. 246) God, justice, and pure language these are al in the 
same position. They cannot appear or be realized of themselves but requite appearance and 
realization 11 another way, therefore essenttal!y reqmring translation. 
Le conrrat de traduction, en ce sens transcendantal, serait le contrat lui-meme, le 
印町田tabsolu, la forme-contrat du contrat, ce qui permet主uncontrat d’erre ce qu'il 
est (p. 236). 
Instead of delving into such religious motifs, I want put emphasis on the transcendental 
strucrure of translation provided by Derrida The distance mainramed in these monfs ts that of 
meaning and !iteraliry According to Derrida, there ts no such distance m sacred texts, which are 
the best example of pure language The contrast between pure language and languages depends 
叩 thisdistance, which perhaps reminds us of the contrast between “voice”(parole) and “wnring” 
(icri却re)in Derrida’s earlier work. 
In De la grammato!ogie，“voice”has the same strucrure of the “absolute erasure of the 
勺ignifiant”aspure language (Derrida, 1967, p. 33). In what Derrida cals the metaphysics of 
pres en間 ion,the dtstance between meanmg and its expre回tonmust be deleted in order to 
achieve the truth, it is the四megoal of languages in Walter Benjamin. Such onto-theology 
whose desire is to exclude the literality is what Dernda aims to restst (p. 21). The dtstance of the 
“sipがe”andthe “signifiant" cannot be erased. This is the very po日ibil町oftranslation: it is its 
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such “悶rural'’way,a五actdiscovered by Saussure (p 68) This explains bo℃h the possibility of 
rewording within one language and the possibility of translanon between two languages: we are 
always already in the translation. To say something is not merely toゐllowthe general rule of 
language, even though It seems to be Rather, it is already a translanon that requires one’s 
singularity. 
From this point, we can understand why the idea of the、erformative，”whichcom田 fromJ. 
L. Austin, is so attractive to Derrida (despi日 Dernda’scrnicism of him) (Derrida, 1972, pp 
367-393). For example, in Force de ioi, 
Or l’operat10n qui revient a fonder, a maugurer，主 justifierle dro1t, a faire le loi, 
consis回日iten coup de五orce,en un violence performative et donc interpre日riveq凶en
elle-m占men’田Eni JUSte ni in Juste et qu’aucune justice . (Derrida, 1994, p 33) 
For Derrida, rhe idea of the “performative”discloses not only the fact that we can do something 
through the use oflanguage but also that we always do. An "act”can only be done through one’S 
singularity In fact, Derrida refers to acts in connection with silence, which belongs to rhe 
element of singularity that I have mentioned in the白rstpart, in the followmg passage (ibid.). It 
implies that everyone us speaks the language that is never belongs回 himThis expenence of the 
other's language is the starting point of Derrida's philosophy, which is also mme of translanon 
as a bilingual. 
LANGUAGE OF THE OTHER 
In Le monolinguisme de !'autre, Derrida writes about his experience of French, 
≪ Je n'ai qu＇山ielangue, ce n'est pas la n11enne.沿（Derrida,1996, p 13) 
This sentence may not seem to make any sense. If we imagine someone living a foreign country, 
It will make sense to四ythat he speaks a language that is not his own. We can understand it as 
the particular experience of him as a Jewish Algerian. But it is that Derrida aims to generalize it. 
1. On ne parle pmais qu’une seule langue…ou plutot un seul idiome. 
2. On ne parle jamais une seule langue-ou plutot il n'y a pas d'idiome pur (p. 21). 
In saying so, Dernda wan目印日lus that every language we speak is not our own, but the 
language of the other.“Thete is no natural property of language", says Dernda, means that what 
we cal mother tongue ot natural language is non-natural ar al. It is not difficult to understand 
It, 1f we just remember that our human beings has an infancy in which we cannot speak and rhat 
what so called natural languages have its history through the usage of human being. Especially, 
we can find such experience of language itself in translation, since we will find that our own 
language is not the only way to relate us to our world in such experience. 
It comes down to that we are alienated form my own language But 白隠れeganvetone 1s )list 
one side of this matter It has a positive tone of the hospitality of language. We can speak any 




I se serair alors forme, ce je, clans Te si日 d'unesituation mrrouvable, renvoyanr 
roujours ailleurs, a aurre chose，主uneaurre langue，主l'aurreen general I se serair sirue 
clans une experience insiruable de la langue, de la langue au sens large, done, de ce mot 
(p. 55). 
The singular“I”is always sent to language of the other, to the other itself. The singularity of 
oneself is then emancipated from its solitude, silence in such experience of language. It’s from 
this point that we can unders阻ndthe double function of language. 
That's what Derrida says in the following passage just afret the ci回目onin the beginning of 
this paper. I will close this paper by such pa四age
Premier effet ou ptem1色redestination du langage: me priver ou aussi bien me delivrer 
de ma singularite (Derrida, 1999, p. 87). 
NOTE 
The odginal version of this paper was presented at Bordeaux-Kyoto Symposium (May 6, 2014, Bordeaux, 
France). 
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